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1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the protection of critical infrastruc-
ture systems (e.g., electric power grids, telecommu-
nication systems, transportation systems and so on) 
has become an important topic. The notion itself of 
"critical infrastructure” implies that these intercon-
nected systems are important. They serve our every-
day life, e.g. they provide the water and electricity in 
our homes, for our physical and financial welfare, 
and support the development of modern societies. 
As all systems, these critical infrastructures are 
exposed to hazardous natural and artificial events, 
such as earthquake, hurricanes, random failures and 
sabotages etc., which make them vulnerable (Wolf-
gang & Zio 2011) Given their importance, the criti-
cal infrastructures need very high-levels of reliabil-
ity and protection (Carlyle et al. 2006, O’Rourke 
2007, Murray & Grubesic 2007). 
A critical infrastructure is composed of subsys-
tems whose operation is interdependent in different 
ways and to different degrees (Rinaldi et al. 2001, 
Rinaldi 2004). The interdependencies and the inter-
actions among the subsystems are the force and the 
weakness of the critical infrastructures. With respect 
to the latter, the major risk is that of an initiating 
failure which propagates from one subsystem to an-
other rendering the global system dysfunctional and 
unstable. The modeling of this dynamics is quite a 
challenging task (Buldyrev et al. 2010, Dobson 
2008, Pederson et al. 2006). 
Several properties make up the capability of a 
system to provide its function and continue to do so 
or recover it, in the presence of failures of some of 
its subsystems. The system must have built-in capac-
ity to resist to the disturbances and be capable to 
adapt to changing environments. The resilience of a 
system includes all these properties, specifically, the 
prevention of and robustness to disturbances, and the 
capability of recovery from failure. 
The analysis and characterization of the resilience 
of critical infrastructures is receiving a lot of atten-
tion from the scientific and technical community. 
For example, (Nozick et al. 2005) uses a supply-
demand graph to represent the interdependency be-
tween infrastructures, and Markov and semi-Markov 
processes for describing the state transitions dynam-
ics. Furthermore, the system performance is meas-
ured and analyzed using a probabilistic distribution. 
Reference (Faraji & Kiyono 2012) proposes a 
weighted stochastic Petri Net modeling approach for 
the analysis of critical infrastructures to describe the 
cascading failure impacts and assess the reliability of 
the infrastructure. The work in (Bloomfield et al. 
2010) builds a stochastic model for the interconnect-
ed critical infrastructures, whereby each component 
is modeled as a random process with a probability to 
switch between two states, operational and failed. 
The metric to measure system performance is given 
in terms of the cascade size resulting from the failure 
process. A System Dynamics (SD) infrastructure 
vulnerability assessment framework is proposed in 
(Tonmoy & El-Zein 2014) to simulate the dependent 
behaviors of the infrastructure subsystems, and a 
measure of system performance is provided. An ex-
tensible graph-theoretical model is provided in 
(Svendsen & Wolthusen 2007) for investigating the 
interdependencies among critical infrastructures. 
The interactions between their components are mod-
eled through a set of response functions on the graph 
edges and resources on the nodes. Reference (Reed 
et al. 2009) introduces a linear input-output model 
for describing the interdependencies among infra-
structures. Methods based on fragility measures and 
quality functions are proposed to evaluate the system 
restoration from natural hazards. 
Furthermore, (Filippini & Zio 2013, Angelo & 
Filippini 2013) represent the infrastructure systems 
in a directed graph and a state dynamics is associat-
ed to each subsystem for describing the failure and 
recovery processes and their interdependent effects. 
A first attempt of resilience analysis is proposed 
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based on invariance concepts and asymptotic stabil-
ity. However, a thorough characterization of the re-
silience and a metric of the system resilience are not 
provided. 
In the present paper, we embrace a similar ap-
proach as in (Angelo & Filippini 2013). We consider 
a topological model of the infrastructure systems de-
scribed by a directed graph, with nodes and edges 
representing the subsystems and the functional de-
pendencies between the subsystems, respectively. 
Next, we proceed with the modeling of the dynamics 
of each subsystem and the related interdependencies. 
For this, we use a state space model with specific 
dynamics governed by parameters characteristic of 
the failure and recovery processes. The analysis of 
the interconnected systems dynamics is performed 
with the objective of identifying the resilience region 
for which the system state converges to the opera-
tion mode, no matter the disturbances affecting the 
system. Invariance concepts are used to find the re-
silience region and to provide conditions on the 
design parameters, which ensure the successful op-
eration of the interconnected systems. Some interest-
ing behaviors of the system are highlighted, e.g. a 
chattering behavior. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces the topological description of the 
interdependent systems, and their associated dynam-
ic model. Section 3 presents the conditions on the 
design parameters, which ensure the existence of a 
resilience region. Discussions based on simulation 
results are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 
draws the conclusions and presents the future work. 
2 PRELIMINARIES AND PREREQUISITE 
This section provides a detailed description of the 
system modeling and also introduces set invariance 
notions, which will be instrumental for the resilience 
analysis of infrastructure systems. 
 
 
Figure 1. Interconnected system. 
2.1 System modeling 
The entire interconnected system can be represented 
by a directed graph, with nodes and directed edges 
describing the network structural characteristics. 
Figure 1 shows such an interconnected system as a 
directed graph, where each node represents a subsys-
tem and the direction of the edge connecting two 
nodes indicates the dependency relationship between 
two subsystems (i.e., the head node is dependent on 
the tail node).  
Within one interdependent infrastructure system, 
its subsystems depend on each other by different 
types of interdependencies. These have different 
causes and modes of manifestations (Buldyrev et al. 
2010, Dobson 2008); formally, these can be de-
scribed in terms of dynamic models and input/output 
constraints. 
In this paper, we refer in particular to physical in-
terdependencies, cyber interdependencies and also 
logical interdependencies. In other words, we de-
scribe the situation for which one subsystem needs 
the resources such as power, control signal, water 
and so on, from another subsystem to keep its func-
tionality. Logical interdependencies can also be tak-
en into account by adding coupling factors to adjust 
the states of the subsystems depending on their logic 
configuration. When all the resources needed are 
provided, the subsystem works in its nominal opera-
tion mode; otherwise, it switches into the out-of-
operation mode. This is a dynamic behavior com-
mon to many interdependent systems and it is well 
captured by the switching model considered here. 
In a switching dynamic model, as the functionali-
ty of a subsystem relies on the production or the ser-
vice provided by other subsystems, the conditions of 
the switching of this subsystem depend on its input 
subsystems. From a system-level point of view, a 
subsystem may continue operating even when the 
inputs of certain resources are partially unavailable; 
in this sense, the buffering and restoration processes 
are both taken into account as two different dynamic 
modes. 
The dynamic model for any subsystem �! is giv-
en by the switching dynamical equations below: 
�! � =
−�!(�!(�)− �!"�!(�))+ �! , for �! ≤ �! ,∀� ∈ �!!∈!!
�! 1− �! � ,                                   for �! ≥ �! ,∃� ∈ �!
   
                                        , (1) 
where, �! is the set of input subsystems of �!  . 
Equation (1) represents a switched dynamics in 
the sense that the value of �! alternates between an 
operation and a failure mode, depending on the val-
ue taken by the current state �! and the state �! of 
all of its input subsystems �!. Subsystem �!  is in a 
nominal operation state if all the states of its input 
subsystems are within their corresponding thresholds 
�!, as described by the first equation in (1). Con-
versely, if one of its input subsystems fails, the sub-
system is in an off-operation state and its dynamical 
behavior is described by the second equation as a 
failure process. 
Note that for � subsystems we have a total of 
2
! modes of functioning for the interconnected sys-
tem, depending where each of the states �! resides. 
Taking into account the dynamics of the entire 
system, we can use a switched Linear Time-
Invariant (LTI) dynamic equation to describe system 
behavior: 
�(�) = �!� � + �!, (2) 
where, �(�) = [�!
!
� ,… , �!
!
� ]!represents the state 
vector of the interconnected system, and matrices 
�! ∈ R
!×! and �! ∈ �
!×! are constructed accord-
ingly, where � = 1,… , 2!.      
 To describe the interdependencies and the relat-
ed dynamics of the interconnected infrastructure sys-
tem, we introduce the following variables and pa-
rameters in the system model: 
�! � ∈ [0,1]  represents the percentage of the 
loss of service or the production unrealized by sub-
system �!  at time t.  
For the subsystem �! , �! � = 0  means that 
�!  can provide full service, or enough products to 
meet the requirement, or other resource support, to 
the other subsystems connected to it as ex-
pected/demanded. When the subsystem �!  cannot do 
so, the value of its state variable augments, 
�! � > 0.  
Under the assumption that the actual amount of 
power produced cannot exceed the intend-
ed/demanded service, the value of the state variable 
is �! � ∈ [0,1]. 
The following parameters are introduced to de-
scribe the state dynamics: 
�! ∈ [0,1] indicates the threshold for state varia-
ble �!(�), which allows evaluating if the subsystem 
�! can provide the output required for the function-
ing of its connected subsystems; in other words, it 
represents the tolerance of system �! for the per-
centage of loss of service: if �! � >  �!, then the 
output is insufficient. 
�! � ∈ [0,1] represents both external and inter-
nal perturbations, which affect the behavior of the 
system in nominal operation. It can be instantaneous 
and more or less strong (e.g. caused by natural disas-
ters, such as earthquake, hurricane or a random 
fault) or continuous and relatively mild (such as sus-
tained wind, electromagnetic interference, degrada-
tion etc.).  
In some situations, instantaneous and continuous 
perturbations can co-exist. 
�! ∈ 0,1  represents the failure rate for the �
!! 
subsystem �! . The time for the state �!  of �!  to 
reach the threshold is the time to failure ���!, in-
troduced in the following equation:  
�!�
!!!! = �!
!!"!
!
. (3) 
From equation (3), we obtain: 
 �� =−
��� 1−�
�
����
 .                                (4) 
Figure 2 illustrates the variation of the time to 
failure with the threshold, for a given value of the 
failure rate. As illustrated, the time to failure in-
creases with the threshold and for larger failure rate 
values the curve gets closer to the horizontal axis, 
which means that the subsystem fails earlier at a 
lower threshold, as reasonable. 
 
Figure 2. Variation of the time to failure (TTF) as a function of 
the threshold �. 
 
  �! ∈ [0,1] represents the recovery rate for subsys-
tem �!. The time to recovery (���!) is the time that 
subsystem �! takes to recover from the failed state 
to the threshold: 
�!�
!!!! = 1− �!  
!!"!
!
. (5) 
  From equation (5), the recovery rate is obtained 
as: 
�! = −
!"# !!
!!!!
 .  (6) 
The recovery process describes a resilience fea-
ture of the system. The time to recovery is a critical 
characteristic of the resilience of infrastructure sys-
tems. In Figure 3, we can see that the time to recov-
ery decreases with the value of the threshold and for 
large recovery rates the time to recovery is small, as 
logical. 
 
Figure 3. Variation of the time to recovery (TTR) as a function 
of the threshold �. 
 
The parameter �!" ∈ [0,1] is the coupling factor 
representing the dependency of the subsystem �! on 
the subsystem �!. The term associated to it in the 
equation (1) represents the rate of the loss of service 
that the �!! subsystem contributes to the �!! sub-
system due to the logical dependencies between 
them. 
The dependency relationships among the subsys-
tems represent the logics between producer and user, 
supplier and consumer, controller and controlled, 
etc. In these functional relationships, physical quan-
tities and information are produced, consumed 
or/and transmitted among the subsystems to ensure 
their functionality. The threshold for one subsystem 
state is set with respect to all its downstream or out-
put subsystems controlled by it. The value of the 
threshold indicates the level of tolerance for the 
downstream subsystems with respect to the accepta-
ble percentage of lost input from the controlling sub-
system.  
The proposed model not only captures the func-
tional relationship between the subsystems (e.g. due 
to physical and cyber dependencies) but also takes 
into account the logical dependency among the sub-
systems. These are originated from human decisions 
and actions. The coupling factor allows considering 
the degree of logical interdependencies in the dy-
namic process of system evolution. 
2.2 Invariance notions 
In this sub-section, few basic concepts related to 
the set-theoretic approach are introduced as neces-
sary. 
Definition 1 (Equilibrium point). The point �! ∈ �
! 
is an equilibrium point (or fixed point) for the differ-
ential equation,  
�(�) = �(�(�)) . 
If � �! = 0. 
Definition 2 (Positive invariance). (Blanchini, 1999) 
A set � ⊂ �! is said to be positively invariant for a 
system of the form 
�(�) = �(� � ) . 
If every solution of the equation with initial condi-
tion � 0 ∈ � verifies � � ∈ � for � > 0. 
Definition 3 (Robust positive invariance, RPI). 
(Blanchini, 1999) A set � ⊂ �! is said to be robust-
ly positively invariant for a system of the form 
�(�) = �(� � ,�(�)) , 
where �(�) ∈� is an exogenous input. If for all 
� 0 ∈ �  and �(�) ∈� , the condition � � ∈ � 
holds for all � ≥ 0.  
3 DETERMINATION OF THE RESILIENCE 
REGION 
This section presents the necessary conditions on the 
design parameters for the existence of a resilience 
region. The region is identified using the invariance 
concepts introduced in Section 2.2 above. 
Proposition 1. Let there be a convex and compact 
set � ∈ �!  and consider the dynamics from (2). 
Whenever equilibrium point �!  associated with 
these dynamics lies into �, we have that there exists 
a subset of O which is an invariant set. 
Proof. If �! is an equilibrium point for one mode of 
the switched system 
� � = �! ∙ �(�)+ �!, 
where � = 1,… , 2!.  
In any functioning mode of the system, the dy-
namic equation of each subsystem is an affine equa-
tion. Moreover, the eigenvalues �! of matrix A sat-
isfy �! ≤ 1， according to the setting of the 
parameters. Hence, the system given by (2) is as-
ymptotically stable.  
Therefore, � ∈ �! is a domain of attraction and 
we can say that all initial states entering in set � 
will remain within the set at all future instances, thus 
� is an invariant set.                        ∎ 
We assume that �! is an equilibrium point in a 
certain dynamic mode of the system, so for the dif-
ferential equation that describes the system dynam-
ics, the equilibrium point satisfies: 
0 = �! ∙ �! + �!.                         (7) 
In our case, we can compute the equilibrium point 
for each operation mode: 
�! = � − �!
!!
∙ �!.     (8) 
For a system with N subsystems, there are 2! 
dynamic modes and the system switches from one to 
another depending on the states of each subsystem. 
The state space of the entire system is a hyper-cube 
[0,1]!, a set divided into 3 main parts: operation re-
gion, failure-recovery region and out-of-operation 
region. In the operation region, all the trajectories of 
the systems lie in the set �:= [0,σ!] × [0,σ!]  ×
 . ..  ×[0,σ!]. The out-of-operation region is the op-
posite,�:= [σ!, 1] × [σ!, 1]  × . ..  ×[σ! , 1] , where-
by all the states of all subsystems are of failure and 
the trajectories converge to an equilibrium point in-
side this failure region. In the proposed model, the 
equilibrium points may exist in the operation and 
out-of-operation regions. 
For the operation mode, all the subsystems take 
the first differential equation: 
�! = −�! �! − �!!�!!∈!! + �!
⋮
�! = −�! �! − �!"�!!∈!! + �!
⋮
�! = −�! �! − �!"�!!∈!! + �!
, (9) 
So the equilibrium point of the operation mode is 
�! = (� − �!)
!!
∙ �!,         (10) 
where, �!  and �! are matrices with appropriate 
dimensions. 
If the equilibrium point is situated inside the op-
eration region we can say that it is invariant: �! ∈
�. Thus, one of the conditions on the design parame-
ters for the existence of a resilience region is: 
[0, . . . ,0]!  ≤ �! ≤ [�!,… ,�!]
!.             (11) 
For all the initial states in the operation region, 
the trajectories of system dynamics remain inside the 
operation region and converge to �!.  
Similarly, the out-of-operation region has the dy-
namics: 
�! = �!(1− �!)
⋮
�! = �!(1− �!)
⋮
�! = �!(1− �!)
 .                      (12) 
If there is an equilibrium point, 
�! = (� − �!)
!!
∙ �!,  (13) 
it satisfies �! ∈ �:  
[�!,… ,�!]
!
≤ �! ≤ [1, . . . ,1]
!.             (14) 
Once the state of the system enters the out-of-
operation mode, the system cannot recover to the 
operation region. The next Proposition demonstrates 
the existence of a resilience region. 
Proposition 2. Let there be a set �!, which is RPI 
under the �!! functioning mode of dynamics (2). 
Hence, the resilience region of the interconnected 
system given in (2) is described by: 
� = �!
!
!
!!! . 
Proof. In the following, we propose a sketch of the 
proof. Consider a set �!", which represents the col-
lection of all the sets where the system initial states 
reside to �  through the corresponding dynamic 
equation of the �!!  functioning mode, after � 
time steps. Therefore, the RPI set under the �!! 
functioning mode can be written as �! =
�!"
!!"#
!!!
, where �!"# is the number of time steps 
for which the initial states in �! converge to �. 
From Proposition 1, we have that � is invariant. 
This implies that the resilience region of the inter-
connected system (2) is given by: 
        � = �!"
!!!
!
!!!!"#
!!!
!!!
= �!
!
!
!!!  .       ∎ 
We denote the region outside the operation and 
out-of-operation regions as the failure-recovery re-
gion. For initial states inside this region, they may 
converge either to the operation region or to the out-
of-operation region in a finite time. We denote by 
reachable regions all those regions composed by the 
system initial states, which converge to the operation 
region in a finite time. Consequently, the overall re-
silience region is represented by the union of the op-
eration region and the reachable regions. In other 
words, the resilience region is defined as the set of 
all initial states of the system that eventually will 
reside into the operation region in finite time (i.e. it 
is composed by the operation region itself plus the 
reachable regions situated within the failure-
recovery region).  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Steps for describing the resilience. 
Figure 4 illustrates the steps for describing the re-
silience region. 
Up to this point we can describe the resilience re-
gions as they appear from the interdependencies re-
lationships and the subsystems’ characteristics. In-
deed, the maximization of the system resilience 
region is the final design, operation and maintenance 
goal. We exemplify this by analyzing the response 
of the system as a function of its parameters, adding 
an element of control in the dynamics such that a 
supervisor can actively counteract failure modes and 
steer the overall system towards the operational 
functioning region. 
4 EXAMPLE AND SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this section, we consider a simple example of an 
interconnected system composed by two subsystems 
as in Figure 4. Given the methodological flavor of 
the work, the structure of the system is purposely 
chosen as simple as possible, in order to not add 
complexity to the study of the interdependencies 
among the subsystems and their dynamical behavior, 
aimed at characterizing the system resilience as a 
function of the design parameters. The interconnect-
ed system in Figure 4 could, for example, represent a 
system composed by a power supply system and a 
telecommunication system, whereby the components 
of the telecommunication system depend on the 
power supplied by the power supply system which, 
in turn, for its functioning makes use of the control 
and monitoring signals provided by the telecommu-
nication system. A theoretical analysis of system re-
silience is performed and the results are collected 
into a Table which reports the parameters values of 
different scenarios of system evolution. 
 
 
Figure.5. Interconnected system composed by two subsystems. 
 
Consider each subsystem in Figure 5 described 
by the dynamic equation given in (2). There are four 
operation modes for the interconnected system, in 
which the dynamics is represented by the following 
equations: 
Operation mode, where � � ∈ � ≔   [0,�!]×
[0,�!]:  
�!(�) = −�! �!(�)− �!"�!(�) + �!
�!(�) = −�! �!(�)− �!"�!(�) + �!
; (15) 
Failure-recovery mode 1, where � � ∈ �! ≔
0,�! ×[�!, 1]:                  
�!(�) = �! 1− �!(�)
�!(�) = −�!(�!(�)− �!"�!(�))
;          (16)        
Failure-recovery mode 2, where � � ∈ �! ≔
[�!, 1] × 0,�! : 
�!(�) = −�!(�!(�)− �!"�!(�))
�!(�) = �! 1− �!(�)
; (17) 
Out-of-operation mode, where � � ∈ � ≔
[�!, 1] ×[�!, 1]: 
�!(�) = �! 1− �!(�)
�!(�) = �! 1− �!(�)
 .     (18) 
Following the procedure described in Section III, 
the equilibrium states for the operation mode and the 
out-of-operation mode are identified: 
�! = [
�!�! + �!"�!�!
(1− �!"�!")�!�!
 
�!�! + �!"�!�!
(1− �!"�!")�!�!
]!  
and �! = [1 1]
!. 
According to Proposition 1, if �! is inside the 
operation region, there exists an invariant set and the 
equilibrium point locus is the location where all the 
states in the invariant set will converge. In this case, 
the invariant set is the operation region itself. 
A similar result is found for the out-of operation 
region, which is also an invariant set with the equi-
librium point (1,1) being the attractor in this region. 
  The conditions for the equilibrium point to be in-
side the operation region are the following:  
0 ≤
!!!!!!!"!!!!
(!!!!"!!")!!!!
≤ �!
0 ≤
!!!!!!!"!!!!
(!!!!"!!")!!!!
≤ �!
. (19)     
In order to analyze the intrinsic characteristics of 
the equilibrium point, we simplify by neglecting the 
logical interdependencies between the subsystems, 
i.e., �!" = �!" = 0. In this case, the above condi-
tions become:  
0 ≤
!!
!!
≤ �!
0 ≤
!!
!!
≤ �!
 . (20) 
Replacing relation (7) in the above equations, we 
obtain: 
���! ≤ −
!"# !!
!!
�!
���! ≤ −
!"# !!
!!
�!
 . (21) 
This allows highlighting directly the dependence 
of the time to recovery from the threshold and dis-
turbance values (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. TTR(�) with fixed disturbance. 
 
If we fix the disturbance �, we can observe the 
invariance of TTR with the threshold: in the space of 
parameters (see Figure 5), the time to recovery 
reaches its maximal value when the threshold is 
around 0.36. 
The next step is the computation of the resilience 
regions within the two failure-recovery regions, as 
described in Section III. 
Once the states �!, �! enter the out-of-operation 
region � at a certain finite time, the system cannot 
recover back to the operation region �. But in the 
two failure-recovery regions �! and �!, it is possi-
ble for the system to return to the operation region. 
To find the specific resilience region, we compute 
a resilience curve to separate the end-to-failure and 
end-to-recovery parts in the failure-recovery region. 
The situation in �! is considered first, whose dy-
namic equations are (the coupling factors are ne-
glected at first): 
�!(�) = �!(1− �!(�))
�!(�) = −�!�!(�)
. (22) 
After integration, we obtain: 
�! � = 1+ �! 0 − 1 �
!!!!    
�! � = �! 0 �
!!!!
. (23) 
 From the equations above, we observe that state 
�! tends to diverge to 1 whereas state �! converges 
exponentially to 0. Therefore, there exists a set of 
states � ∈ �! which pass the point (�!,�!) at a 
certain time t=T. The set M is represented by the fol-
lowing state equations, with initial conditions �!(0) 
and �!(0): 
 
�! � = 1+ �! 0 − 1 �
!!!! = �!
�! � = �! 0 �
!!!! = �!
.     (24) 
The set of the initial states which pass the point 
(σ!,σ!) at time T is the curve described by: 
�! 0 = 1+ �! − 1
!! !
!!
!!
!! , (25) 
where �! 0 ∈ 0,�!  and �! 0 ∈ �!, 1 . 
In �! where the failure is generated in �!, the 
set of initial states who pass the point (�!,�!) can 
be identified similarly, and we have the curve: 
�! 0 = 1+ �! − 1
!! !
!!
!!
!! , (26) 
where �! 0 ∈ �!, 1  and �! 0 ∈ 0,�! . 
Figure 7 illustrates the resilience curves, which 
separate the resilience regions from the non-
resilience regions within the failure-recovery region, 
as described by the equations (25) and (26).  
When the design parameters are outside the 
bounds imposed by conditions (19), the system will 
not recover i.e., the state trajectories will always 
converge to the (1,1) equilibrium point outside the 
(white) operation region as in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 7. Four operation regions and the curves separating the 
resilience region and non-resilience region. 
 
 
Figure 8. Resilience curve and system trajectories with differ-
ent initial conditions. 
Figure 8 depicts several state trajectories for dif-
ferent initial conditions of the system. We observe 
that as long as the equilibrium point (denoted as the 
black dot) is inside the operation region (denoted in 
white) the system trajectories reside at all times in 
the resilience region. This means that for the design 
parameters fulfilling conditions (19) the system will 
always recover from unexpected event. 
 
 
Figure 9. Chattering behavior for the system trajectories with 
different initial conditions. 
 
The equilibrium point locus is another important 
aspect for the system resilience. For example, if the 
equilibrium point of the operation mode resides in 
the failure-recovery region, we can observe a chat-
tering behavior like the one shown in Figure 9. 
Similarly with the previous case, we can deter-
mine some conditions on the model parameters such 
that we can a priori identify the chattering behavior:  
In �! ≔ �!, 1 ×[0,�!]  
If the equilibrium point is located in the resilience 
region of R1, then: 
�!!
=
!!
!!
�!!
=
!!
!!
 . (27) 
Then, we get the inequalities: 
0 ≤
!!
!!
≤ 1+ �! − 1
!!
!!!!
!!
!!
�! <
!!
!!
≤ 1
. (28) 
In  �! ≔ �!, 1 × 0,�!  
We get similar results: 
�! <
!!
!!
≤ 1
0 ≤
!!
!!
≤ 1+ �! − 1
!!
!!!!
!!
!!
 . (29) 
The conditions (20), (28), (29) allow steering the pa-
rameters values in a way to get different scenarios of 
system evolution, as in Table 1. 
The resilience scenario and the chattering scenar-
io are those observed in Figures 7 and 8. To elimi-
nate the chattering behavior, a control law can be 
added into the model of the interconnected system. 
Further work will be devoted in the future to the 
design of control strategies aimed at system chat-
tering behavior elimination. 
 Parameters 
Resilience 
Scenario 
Chattering 
Scenario 1 
Chattering 
Scenario 2 
�! 0.6 0.6 0.6 
�! 0.7 0.7 0.7 
�! 0.3 0.3 0.3 
�! 0.4 0.4 0.4 
�! 0.1 0.1 0.1 
�! 0.2 0.2 0.2 
�! [0.5,1] 0.7 [0.49,1] 
�! [0.57,1] [0.55,1] 0.8 
Table 1. Parameters values. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
This paper adopts a set-theory framework for the 
resilience analysis of interconnected infrastructure 
systems. A detailed description of the system dy-
namics modeling is provided and invariance proper-
ties are analyzed to define and identify the resilience 
region, as a function of the governing parameters. 
This allows controlling the characteristics of the sys-
tem resilience properties by design, operation and 
maintenance properties as represented by the values 
of the related parameters. An illustration of the ana-
lytical power of the framework adopted is provided 
on an interconnected interconnected system case 
study, with detailed discussions of its behavior and 
response to failures and/or disturbances, based on 
simulation results.  
REFERENCES 
Angelo, A. & Filippini, R. 2013. "Evaluation of Resilience of 
Interconnected Systems Based on Stability Analysis." Criti-
cal Information Infrastructures Security. Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg, 180-190. 
Bloomfield, R. Buzna, L. Popov, P. Salako, K. & Wright, D. 
2010, “Stochastic modelling of the effects of interdepend-
encies between critical infrastructure,” in Critical Infor-
mation Infrastructures Security. Springer, pp. 201–212. 
Buldyrev, S. V. Parshani, R. Paul, G. Stanley, H. E. & Havlin, 
S. 2010. “Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent 
networks,” Nature, vol. 464, no. 7291, pp. 1025–1028. 
Carlyle, G. Salmeron, M. J. & Wood, K. 2006. “Defending 
critical infrastructure,” Interfaces, vol. 36, no. 6, pp. 530–
544. 
Dobson, I. 2008. “Analysis of cascading infrastructure fail-
ures,” Wiley Hand-book of Science and Technology for 
Homeland Security. 
Faraji, M. & Kiyono, J. 2012. “Infrastructure performance ori-
ented reliability using assessment using weighed stochastic 
petri net,” 15WCEE, Lisboa. 
Filippini, R. & Zio, E. 2013. "integrated resilience and risk 
analysis framework for critical infrastructures", in Proceed-
ing of ESREL conference, pp. 2001-2008. 
Murray, A. T. & Grubesic, T. H. 2007. Critical infrastructure: 
reliability and vulnerability. Springer Berlin, vol. 16. 
Nozick, L. K. Turnquist, M. A. Jones, D. A. & Davis, J. R. 
2005. “Assessing the performance of interdependent infra-
structures and optimising investments,” International jour-
nal of critical infrastructures, vol. 1, no. 2, pp.144–154. 
O’Rourke, T. D. 2007. “Critical infrastructure, interdependen-
cies, and resilience,” Bridge-Washington-National Acade-
my of Engineering, vol. 37, no. 1, p. 22. 
Pederson, P. Dudenhoeffer, D. Hartley, S. & Permann, M. 
2006. “Critical infrastructure interdependency modeling: a 
survey of us and international research,” Idaho National 
Laboratory, pp. 1–20. 
Reed, D. A. Kapur, K. C. & Christie, R. D. 2009. “Methodol-
ogy for assessing the resilience of networked infrastruc-
ture,” Systems Journal, IEEE, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 174–180. 
Rinaldi, S. M. Peerenboom, J. P. & Kelly, T. K. 2001. “Identi-
fying, un-derstanding, and analyzing critical infrastructure 
interdependencies,” Control Systems, IEEE, vol. 21, no. 6, 
pp. 11–25. 
Rinaldi, S. M. 2004. “Modeling and simulating critical infra-
structures and their interdependencies,” in System sciences, 
2004. Proceedings of the 37th annual Hawaii international 
conference on. IEEE, pp. 54–61. 
Svendsen, N. K. & Wolthusen, S. D. 2007. “Connectivity mod-
els of inter-dependency in mixed-type critical infrastructure 
networks,”Information Security Technical Report, vol. 12, 
no. 1, pp. 44–55. 
Tonmoy, F. & El-Zein, A. 2014. “Vulnerability of infrastruc-
ture to sea level rise: A combined outranking and system-
dynamics approach,” in Safety, Reliability and Risk Analy-
sis: Beyond the Horizon. CRC Press. 
Wolfgang, K. & Zio, E. 2011. Vulnerable systems. Springer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
